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The appearance of political advertising in the Republic of Moldova ten years ago did not particularly attract attention of Moldovan civil society. Neither ordinary citizens, nor politicians hurried to start discussions about this new way of political communication. Even the Legislature had no desire to regulate it. In 1994, the Moldovan Parliament adopted a law on advertising, but it specified that this law did not refer to political advertising.

 

The magic wand

It is unlikely that the phenomenon of the political advertising has been understood from the beginning, being accepted as something ordinary and extremely necessary for the new-born independent country, or classified as something totally unserious and without a future. More likely, intentionally or not, political advertising has been left to its fate.

It would be simple to suppose that this negligence took place because society had more important problems to solve. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of political advertising does not deserve to be ignored. In spite of the fact that some politicians categorically rejected this method of communication from the beginning, calling it a waste of money and saying it would not be effective in influencing voters’ decisions, in the end — some of them earlier and some of them later — nearly all of them felt the necessity of trying this magic wand.

Has it been essential for all election campaigns since 1991?

Political advertising also existed in Moldova in the Soviet era, but under a different name and with a totally propagandistic character designed to serve the communist ideology. The call for the development of new methods of advertising in the political sphere in Moldova started with the establishment of the multi-party system, which has led to the diversification of the political press in direct relation to the number of new-born political formations.

The majority of politicians, former members of the communist party, hurried to promote their political product, conferring on their newspapers the role of propaganda platform. For this reason, the new-born political press has followed the same principles as in the preceding regime — serving the interests of political power.

Political products in the independent Moldova have been advertised on radio stations and TV channels. Politicians believed in the power of mass media, especially because mass media was seen in the Soviet period as an important factor in making it easier for the population to memorize political goals.

In addition, the transition period was advantageous for the politicians, because the citizens showed a special interest in everything that was considered new in the society. During the first years of independence, symbols and the political messages were easily sent during large meetings and also through the state and independent media. The increased interest of citizens in political issues was fuelled especially by a big confrontation between the supporters of the national revival and those favouring the return of the previous regime at any price.

The population continued to absorb long speeches during this period. But, slowly-slowly, the public attitude toward politicians is shifting. The hope for quick changes and a better level of life is dying under the pressure of difficult economic conditions. The establishment of new economic relations, and the development of the market, influenced not only the political sphere but also the social sectors for which the image in the public mind becomes an important factor, particularly when the actions of the social domains’ representatives become antagonistic.

Despite the economic crisis, here and there also political crisis, politicians and their parties used different kinds of political advertising, promoting their messages (oral or written, video and/or audio) in different ways: at meetings, through the press and electronic media, and with literature and art, caricatures, photos, posters, leaflets, cartoons or souvenirs.

Complex messages and classic strategies

It is important to mention that the messages the politicians used in their political spots during the electoral campaigns of the 1991-2009 period were quite complex. In quick succession politicians have chosen to include in their messages various elements: declarations, arguments, solutions, questions, announcements, and also information about the electoral candidate/s or the political formation/s that she/he/they represented.

In most cases, candidates have tried to send their electoral messages, emphasising the text, which was enhanced by pictures. Some of them managed to provide a picture for each word or expression. Some, especially those representing smaller parties, did not manage it so well.

In the end optical communication proved to be more frequent than verbal communication. It was used particularly at the beginning or at the end of spots where most of the symbolic elements and loud sounds were presented to attract people’s attention or persuade them to take a particular decision.

During 1991-2009 the images have been replacing the text or reducing it significantly, to just a word or two, when politicians try to influence voters on a subconscious level, particularly in their negative ads.

In spots, the messages contain symbolic elements, promises, nice words or criticisms. Mainly they emphasise the candidate’s role or the role of the leader of the political formation he represents, mention the support of ordinary people or celebrities, show the candidate as a defender of the people’s rights, call for national unity, support the values of the ethnic minorities, and also national and European values, encourage or discourage voters to participate in the election, stress the power of the candidate, create a myth, or present the candidate as one of us or show him or her in action.

Exploring the same messages

Except for the local elections of 2003 and 2007, elements regarding a myth or the defence of ethnic minorities’ values were used in the spots of all electoral contestants during all campaigns. The same subjects were used by the majority of candidates during every electoral campaign, according to the existing circumstances. For example, in 2007 the electoral messages of the majority of the candidates were focused on Moldova’s perspective of joining the EU.

During all electoral campaigns, the candidates tried to attract attention to their political ads by using optimistic slogans, full of promises or capable of creating nice dreams about the future. Few slogans, though, were successful. Even if they could be easily understood, the majority of them were difficult to memorise, because they included long sentences that did not stress the main idea.

The slogans, and the texts from the examined period, as well, show themselves to have been influenced very little by any political dogma. Regarding the ideological approach, their messages have a tendency to have a general or unclear character, leaving the voters to interpret them as they wish.

Since the country’s declaration of independence, politicians from the Republic of Moldova have tried to use more and more advanced tricks to create a memorable image for the voters. Each candidate individually shapes his advertising message to give it an evocative character but also uses arguments, even if the strategies stay classic: for the candidate or against the opponent.

Political advertising tricks

The messages in support of the candidate are used to encourage voters and also to influence those who are undecided, offering them information that can make them feel proud, afraid, honest or patriotic. Often politicians use symbols, images with a semantic load, to manipulate voters’ opinions.

Among the successful symbols used by Moldovan politicians in their political ads are: the heart, the sun, the hammer and sickle, the rose, the lion, the dove. Each is identified with a particular political force and attracts a certain number of supporters. The politicians use symbols that do not accentuate their ideological affiliations: the European stars, the bell, the bell tower, the flag of the Republic of Moldova, the sky. But nothing can be certain; even the most successful symbols can advantage a candidate sometimes and disadvantage him at other times.

Moldovan politicians make their first steps in political advertising by adopting in their political ads well-known ideas and characters. The politicians’ images refer especially to their opinions and less to their physical appearance, which is usually considered secondary and remains unnoticed.

Also, electoral candidates prefer to use only the positive facts from their biographies in their spots. The references to their family lives are very superficial, often only to accentuate that they are married. In cases where there appears to be a problem with a family member, the politicians prefer to avoid saying anything about it.  For this reason, it is obvious that what voters learn from the political advertising is not necessarily the truth.

Until 2009, there persisted in the political advertising in Moldova more images with symbolic and mythical dimensions that referred to an expected future. Dominant also were images-prognosis. Very few images had cognitive significance, which could have been useful to voters in the decision-making process.

For promotion of their political images, Moldovan politicians chose to present their identities and their particularities with strategies that could idealise or emphasise their potential and resistance.

An image of a party was created through the image of its leader to obtain an identity transfer. There were also other kinds of images as: the leader-president, a brief or a long-lasting popular defender, a combatant, a politician capable of uniting the country, a politician open to dialog, the saviour of the nation, a combatant on behalf of the nation, a politician ending the alliances, a politician capable of understandings his citizens, a traitor, a defender of people’s rights, an honest leader, a national political leader, a leader-reformer, a representative of the middle class, one of us, a good-natured person, a manager, or a family person.

Political marketing

Although political marketing principles started being applied, attracting professionals to the political communication sphere was not very successful. For example, while in Western countries political advertising campaigns were not considered any more effective when they tended to promote the party’s image, in Moldova this was still considered a valid technique, even if the trend of some ads promoting politicians’ images appeared.

The principles of political marketing need to be applied with care if maintaining the country’s democratic course is desired. When the political system is increasingly guided by marketing, there is a danger that images will be preferred over logic, politicians over social needs, and audio segments over collective dialog.

According to researchers, the goal of political advertising as a method of political communication is to influence people’s conception of political issues and politicians. Political advertising is always developed in order to persuade. During electoral campaigns, the candidates’ images are situated between political messages and the voters’ opinion about these messages. A political behaviour like voting, for example, happens taking into account the political images that appear according to voters’ conceptions, positions and feelings.

From the consumer point of view, the understanding of the purpose of the voting procedure increases the importance of the electoral process: it does not allow the voter to have a clear vision about his country’s future, but only offers an opportunity for the candidate to say and to do everything he can to be elected.

Therefore we can conclude that until 2009 political advertising in Moldova did not inform citizens about the options they had, as consumers of the political product, but instead gave complete priority to politicians to serve their personal interests.

There is no doubt that in this case the process of information or of building trust was under the control of politicians rather than under the control of the mass media. In fact, political advertising is considered a unique way of mass information, the development of which is totally under politicians’ control.

Within the limits of the legal framework and aesthetic principles, developers of political advertising in Moldova were free to say what they wanted, to change journalists’ priorities, to accentuate the positive sides of their clients and as well as the negative sides of their clients’ rivals.

Voters’ perception 

However, political advertising was unlikely to influence the decisions of voters, because so far it has interested them only for its entertaining character. The results of research conducted in the Republic of Moldova two weeks before the parliamentary elections of the 6th of March 2005 proved that voters do not give serious consideration to political advertising because in their opinion it is not a proper source of information. Voters said political advertising can manipulate public opinion because it contains information that is wrong, difficult to understand, not serious or too negative.

It seems that politicians preferred to provoke voters’ interest in a game at the end of which voters had to accept what was proposed to them: to vote for the candidate. The majority of electoral candidates were interested in gathering votes rather than in investing in their future. They did not like to spend their efforts or their money on preparing a steady audience of supporters.

Basically, this leads to a situation in which society cannot have constant values. At the same time, many of the discussions approached in the extremely politicised and polarised mass media obstruct a detailed examination of the politicians and their parties’ experience.

Vulnerable terrain

We can say that political advertising in the Republic of Moldova was vulnerable terrain. Some spots disadvantaged politicians because they contained scattered and incomplete information. The communication between the candidate and the voter through the political advertising became sometimes difficult and because of the way the information was presented or codified.

Many politicians could not find the proper key for the population’s opinions. The desired effect was not achieved most of the time, because the political advertising did not become the object of big admiration or the cause of big discomfort.

Political advertising could disappear just as it appeared, in a silent way, if people totally lost their trust in politicians. This could happen under different circumstances. Certainly, if citizens would inform themselves before voting for one candidate or another regarding which political platform might ameliorate their daily lives the soonest, then their chances of not being manipulated by the tricky political messages would be much stronger.

From the historical course of the Republic of Moldova

 Abstract:

The present article describes severe problems that have appeared in the relationship between mass media in Moldova and the forces that have held political power since the country declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. In the euphoria that followed the throwing off of the Soviet yoke, many people in Moldova assumed that freedom of the press would almost instantly become a reality. However, an examination of the facts shows this did not take place. Using concrete historical events, the author demonstrates that there have been two predominant issues with regard to the engagement of journalism with political power – a misunderstanding of the role of mass media in a democracy, and the lack of a well-formed state policy concerning mass media. In particular, the article examines the privatization of government newspapers, the evolving degree of state censorship, the quality of Teleradio-Moldova, and the activity of mass media during pre-electoral campaigns.            

 

Key words: Moldovan mass media, censorship, Teleradio-Moldova, pre-electoral campaigns, Internet

 

The press and political power

During the transition from the previous regime, the political sphere in the Republic of Moldova had a very uncertain attitude toward the national press. On the one hand politicians believed they could influence the press, but on the other they often expressed dissatisfaction about what the press was publishing. The representatives of political power still held the conception that the press was a ‘tool’ necessary for the realization of their goals. They continued to consider journalists ‘paid servants’ and often criticized them for ineffectiveness or unexpected disobedience. In the Republic of Moldova, as in other former Soviet republics, journalists had been among those in the front lines of opposition and had expressed revulsion at the preceding regime. And Moldovan society had showed support for the changes that had been appearing in the press since in 1989. Yet many newspapers retained a strong propagandistic character. Some even kept their old names: Victoria (Victory), Calea lui Ilici (Lenin’s Way), Prietenia (Friendship), Pentru communism (For Communism), Zorile (Daybreak), Gloria (Glory), Biruitorul (The Winner), Drapelul Rosu (The Red Flag), Steaua Rosie (The Red Star).

At the beginning of the ’90s, all local newspapers in Moldova were controlled and funded by the executive administration of the Government. During that period, it was very difficult to change the previous style of newspapers. It is true that the press opposed the political power structure by standing up for better social conditions but, as before, its character remained more political than informational.

The first newspaper that managed to ‘break the ice’ was Glasul. Shortly afterward, journalists from the newspapers Moldova Socialista, Viaţa Satului, Literatura si Arta, Chisinau, Gazeta de seara followed the same path.

The relationship between press and political power became strained each time newspapers tried to raise the issue of press freedom. The intention of newspapers to present events in a pluralistic way was stated often, but it remained far from a reality. In fact, many newspapers ended up affiliating themselves with political parties.

Although newspapers preferred to be impartial and independent, journalists tried to find political owners for their newspapers to gain economic support or whatever protection might be needed in case of conflict.

Within the last few years in the Republic of Moldova, the Government has gradually reduced its ownership of mass media properties. In spite of that, state authorities continued to exercise considerable control over audiovisual media, especially Teleradio-Moldova, the single TV station with national coverage. Except for the period of 1992-6, this medium has continued to serve political power and not the public, on whose contributions the station has depended since its public status was adopted in 1995. In addition, several newspapers in different districts of the country are also under state control, funded from local government budgets.

It is also obvious that it is not only during the pre-electoral periods that political parties try to influence the press. Their strong tendency to manipulate the informational environment starts immediately after being invested with power by voters.

Many newspapers that declared, during the initial period of democratization, their predisposition to become the fourth estate today serve politicians instead. Mass media accept working with and for political parties in part to ensure pluralism in the new social conditions, but also for economic reasons (Macovei, 2005: 5), as did many other businesses during the transitional period.

The development of the party press started in the Republic of Moldova at the beginning of ’90s, when more than 50 political organizations were created in the country, the number of which dropped to 27 in 2007. Almost all of these organizations decided to publish their own newspapers. Among party newspapers that circulated in the Republic of Moldova shortly after 1990 were: Republica (Social Democrat Party), Cuvantul (Communist Party), Dreptatea (Socialist Party), Mesagerul (The Congress of Intellectuals), Pamant si Oameni (Agricultural Democratic Party), Observatorul de Chisinau (Reform Party), Moldovanul (Republican Party),  Albina (Labour Democrat Party), Libertatea (Liberal Party), Luceafarul (Revival and Conciliation Party), Dialog (Movement For Democratic and Prosperous Moldova), Furnica (Civil Socialist Movement Political Alliance for Reform). 

The publishing activity of political parties proved to be strong but inconsistent, as well: There were increases during pre-election campaigns, peaks during elections and dramatically decreases after every election, especially for those parties that did not win any seats in Parliament.

According to the estimates of some scholars, 40% of all newspapers in the Republic of Moldova in 2006 were party newspapers (Marin, 2001: 3). The phenomenon of the political press of the Republic of Moldova should not be examined primarily as a positive result of the democratic process. These newspapers were ‘more an avatar of times past from which we try to escape’ (Marin, 1999: 22).

Some independent Moldovan newspapers showed their intention to join the political sphere as independent players by their resistance to political parties’ attempts to control the informational environment. For example, in 2000 the independent newspaper Jurnal de Chisinau tried on several pages to create a portrait of the ideal president of the country and to make readers imagine his election.

It is difficult to understand the character of this political trick and to determine if it was an intended or a spontaneous action. The interviews with the current president or with people from his entourage – favoured, sentimental,  even delightful, part of the category of “bowing journalism” – were  published on the newspaper’s pages alongside articles that contained insults addressed to the first person (president) of the country or just ignored him completely’ (Moraru, 2001: 130).

The newspaper-members of API have a different attitude toward political power[1] . Their main goal is to bring together the politically non-affiliated press. Despite the existence of this kind of press, Moldovan society and private media cannot manage to line up against the political power because they do not yet constitute a strong force.

The privatization of governmental newspapers

It is believed that the privatization of the Moldovan media that took place at the beginning of the ’90s amounted to a transfer of the communist party’s property to the state administration, a limiting of the access of citizens to impartial sources of information and also a privileged funding of media in relation to their willingness to serve power (Marin, 2001: 2).

Analysts remark that, in contrast with other countries, Moldovan mass media did not gain anything from privatization. The privatization of the press was carried out at a fast pace after the collapse of the preceding regime and the prohibition of the Communist Party. Journalists lost a good opportunity to achieve freedom. Even the Casa Presei (Press House) where, during the Soviet period, most national newspapers had their headquarters because it was built with contributions of the members of the Union of Journalists, was listed as the state property.

After the coup in Moscow and the proclamation of independence of the Republic of Moldova a grandiose plan was activated. While journalists in Baltic countries privatized within two or three months publishing houses and offices, reorganized their activity and became independent, we had to pass through a condition of euphoria that harmed us a lot. We did not take into account many things. We did not monitor the situation. We could not understand some very important things, because we were not familiar with many economic details. After privatization journalists were left with only a pen to write. National newspapers found lots of troubles in front of them. They had to pay for printing, rent and many other services. They and the local press found themselves on the street. Their offices were split up among different state institutions. Casa Presei passed into the possession of the Government. The publishing house Universul was also listed among state possessions. A big mistake was the interruption of the wire radio, which resulted in inadequate information being transmitted to various parts of the country’ (Spinei, 2001).    

Beginning with the changes that developed in Moldovan society during Gorbachev’s Glasnost, neither the Government nor the Parliament could explain their attitude toward the Press, especially toward the newspapers they owned. In 1990, Moldova Socialista belonged to the Government, but Sovetskaya Moldavia belonged to the Principal Comity of the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova. In 1991, the situation of these newspapers became more difficult because the Government declared its intention to stop their funding. Sovetskaya Moldavia closed its offices right after the coup in Moscow, in August 1991. A group of journalists which for so long had not even attempted to escape the confines of the Communist Party had to find a way forward. First, they could work for Grajdanin Moldovi newspaper, which was created the same year at the initiative of the prime minister, Mircea Druc. The Government decided that the property of Sovetskaya Moldavia would be transferred to the new publication. Once again, journalists were not ready to make a decision. It was obvious that the newspaper could not be of any use to the Communist Party which was banned at the time. In the end, journalists published their newspaper under a new name, Nezavisimaya Moldova, as a newspaper of the Parliament and the Government. Journalists violated a law under which they were required to first register their new edition with the relevant state organization, but they were fortunate because they were supported by politicians, including Valeriu Matei and Alexandru Mosanu (Zamura, 2001: 7). 

In 1992, the Russian edition of Nezavisimaya Moldova and the Romanian edition of Sfatul Tarii were dedicated most of all to covering the Parliament. Nezavisimaya Moldova did not have the same policy as Sfatul Tarii, which chose to oppose the political power structure. In 1993, Sfatul Tarii was closed down. Nezavisimaya Moldova continued to appear with the same status for one more year. In 1995 it found asylum under government protection.

During the transition period, Moldova Suverana increased its orientation toward independence. In January 1994, before parliamentary elections, the newspaper appeared as the ‘national independent newspaper that opens a new page in its journey, 6th series’ (Τopa, 1994: 1). This time the funders were journalists who declared themselves ready to avoid association with political power. The journalists’ decision was based on the fact that the executive administration was struggling to support them financially. In support of their demand, journalists decided to put out Moldova Suverana only three times a week and to stop the free publication of articles from the Government and the Parliament in the newspaper. But Moldova Suverana’s independent status lasted only 48 hours. The newspaper kept the label ‘6th edition’ for just a short time. Later in 1994, Moldova Suverana started its 7th edition as a weekly social, political and cultural newspaper that carried news and commentary. After the parliamentary elections, the newspaper began once again to be funded by the Government, formed now by the winner, the Democrat Agrarian Party. 

In 2005, the communist Government announced that it would divest itself of its ownership of Nezavisimaya Moldova and Moldova Suverana. The prime minister, Vasile Tarlev, declared to the press that the decision of the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova came as a result of a political agreement with Popular Christian-Democrat Party. It is believed among Moldovan journalists that the newspapers were freed by the communists from government ownership in exchange for Popular Christian-Democrat Party’s support for the re-election of the president of the Republic of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin.

The privatization of Nezavisimaya Moldova and Moldova Suverana was done in a very non-transparent way, without any announcement that it would be sold at an auction. In spite of the new status, both newspapers continued to serve the political power.

In 1989, two months after the appearance of Glasul newspaper, the Viata Satului newspaper, which was still an instrument of the Central Comity of the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova, circulated half in the Cyrillic alphabet and half in the Latin alphabet, which was now reappearing for the Romanian language. Viata Satului changed its status immediately after Moldova Socialista asked to stop being the newspaper of the Central Comity and to become instead a newspaper of the Government and Presidency. The Central Comity called the editor-in-chief of Viata Satului to announce that the newspaper would appear three times per week under the protection of the Central Comity. But journalists refused to accept this.

We said will die but we will not do it. Indeed it was not easy to say something like that before the coup in August 1991. I went to Prime Minister Druc and asked him to let us become a government newspaper. The next day we were already governmenl newspaper. In this way we liberated ourselves politically and became in practise an independent newspaper. Druc did not like very much to be strict, but then he needed to play Luchinschi’s game[2]. There were also bureaucratic decisions and many other details’ (Spinei, 2001).

Another newspaper that asked to change its status was Chisinau, gazeta de seara. On 1 August 1990 it became the newspaper of the Chisinau municipal branch of the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova. Its funders were the Communist Party and journalists. Chisinau, gazeta de seara decided its main goals would be supporting the Communist Party and presenting the activities of all socio-political movements oriented toward reform. Soon, the journalists complained that:

In comparison with other pro democracy newspapers, Chisinau, gazeta de seara has completely unequal conditions concerning: the number of staff members, the salaries for writers, the funds available for freelancers and the way the authorities value the creativity of its correspondents’ (Skvirenko, 1990: 3).  

Although the journalists advocated its economic independence, they also asked that Chisinau, gazeta de seara officially become the capital newspaper and be treated at the same level as government newspapers. At that time, the newspaper circulated in two languages but had half the staff of Sovetskaya Moldavia, where journalists had salaries that were approximately 50% higher. The newspaper tried ‘to be able to contribute to publishing unique magazines and additional editions with social-political commercial and business content’ (Skvirenko, 1990: 3). But in the end it was closed at the same time as Viaţa Satului because of its inability to urgently find a way to function effectively in the difficult economic situation.

Today in the Republic of Moldova there are only a few local newspapers still funded from the public budgets. The representatives of API and CIJ[3] declare that the proper changes in the activity of local administration press can be ensured only with the adoption of a law for privatization of mass media in the Republic of Moldova (Lazur, 2006: 23). If that does not happen, these media are expected to follow the unpleasant practise of Nezavisimaya Moldova and Moldova Suverana or of other newspapers, the titles of which already are relegated to the past.

 

Censorship

Since censorship was abolished in the Republic of Moldova by the Constitution[4], the state administration has continued to control the written press, and the audiovisual media, as well, in many indirect ways. Scholars believe that was to be expected (Smid, 1996: 121) in a society where the decisive factor influencing the functioning of mass media was the change of the political system.

In the new social conditions, this regrettable development occurred due to the poorly conceived policy adopted by political power toward the mass media: to influence them in a way that would either make them its perfect ‘tools’ or destroy them.

Some leading journalists say the period during which they had the most freedom of expression was 1988-1991 (Spinei, 2001). In spite of the fact that self-censorship was a predominating factor, the challenge of revealing things about which they had been unable to speak before was also enormous. However, journalists overlooked the possibility of putting in place a real policy to ensure mass media freedom. At that time, when so many new developments dominated Moldovan society following the collapse of the Soviet Union, everyday events seemed more important.

All of the policies regarding mass media implemented in Central Eastern Europe were impulsive and spontaneous and usually presented the existing opinion of the society according to its position about political representation (Smid, 1996: 125).

Since the creation of the independent Moldovan state, journalists have served the Government and the Parliament more than the citizens. After so many years of strict and dogmatic control by the Communist Party, serving power was already to a great extent a habit for journalists. In addition to the wish of the citizenry not to return to old tendencies and practises in the society, there was an opinion that no policy regarding mass media was necessary. Nor was the political circle interested in having a mass media policy created. This misunderstanding of the reality occurred at a time when the negative attitude toward the past had to be transformed into a positive attitude toward the future. To organize and implement something it was important to understand not only the ‘must not’, but also the ‘must’ and the ‘how’.

According to analysts, there was in the Republic of Moldova ‘a general discrepancy between democratic principles proclaimed constitutionally and their implementation at legislative and practical levels’ (Cantir, 1997: 12). ‘Not a single law [in the Republic of Moldova] defines the concept of “censorship”, there is not any efficient way of combating it or punishment of the persons that apply it[5].

A study showed that 81.3% of journalists believed that indirect censorship existed in the Republic of Moldova, while only 13.5% believed that direct censorship existed in the country. The study showed that journalists believed censorship was encouraged by: the presidency (53%), the Parliament (45.4%), the Government (41.5%), political parties (41.5%), double bookkeeping (24.1%) and the Intelligence and Information Service (22.5%)[6].

Censorship practises could be said to be embodied in many different legislative regulations, because all governments since the Republic of Moldova gained independence, regardless of ideology, had tried to control the media. For example, in 1995, according to the Press Law, newspapers were obligated to reregister at the Justice Ministry. That bureaucratic system obstructed the reregistering of 430 of the 500 newspapers that existed in the country, including foreign press organizations. The registration procedure was especially difficult for the opposition press. The Government ordered banks to freeze the accounts of media that did not manage to register in time. The publishing houses also had to stop the editing of those newspapers. ‘The hidden censorship mechanism was criticized even by some representatives of the governmental press; professional organizations considered the reregistering procedure ‘a massive attack against press, a manifestation of bureaucracy and a premeditated escalation of the situation’ (Cantir, 1997: 13).

Representatives of the state administration used the difficult economic circumstances to control press they deemed unpleasant. ‘The Government condemned to death Literatura si Arta by replacing an ideological censorship with an economic one’ (Dabija, 1994). Other media managers expressed the opinion that it would be better for newspapers and news agencies not to be considered commercial businesses so as not to give the Government the opportunity to close them down after routine checks by tax or police authorities.

In December 1995, the Parliament ratified changes to the Press Law (point 6). The registration of newspapers and news agencies had to be performed at the Justice Ministry, but if the newspaper or the news agency had, in addition to its basic profile, commercial activities then the registration had to be done according to the Contracts and Businesses Law. Although in February 1996 changes were made to that law, registration was still difficult because of very bureaucratic procedures.

According to the Press Law, all newspapers and news agencies were supposed to be exempt from paying taxes. But the state budget enacted for 1996 exempted only 50% of mass media from taxes, including the state newspapers Moldova Suverana, Nezavisimaya Moldova and publications for children. In 1997, no newspapers were exempted from paying taxes because the Parliament failed to include the 12th article of the Press Law in the Law about the state budget. In March 1997, deputies decided to tax state newspapers, but in the end this decision was cancelled.

In 2001 in Moldova, the political power opposed a bill to establish a large TV company, Stil TV. In 2006, Antena C και Euro TV had to change course. The procedure by which these audiovisual media were privatized was not transparent at all. Representatives of civic organizations observed that this case violated the Code of the Audiovisual Media. Basically, the principle of privatization of mass media was used to turn the municipal media Euro TV and Antena C into private sector companies that agreed to serve political power. ‘Thereby the political power shows a shortage of political will for assimilation of democratic values in the same way it mismanages public funds to support certain local newspapers that serve it without any transparency[7].

The influence of political power was always especially noticeable in the activity of Teleradio-Moldova Company. Analysts who talk about the way in which public opinion was misled underline the significant damage this pseudo-public TV Company inflicted on the democratic course of the country over many years. The disappointment of researchers seems deep when they stress that, in the Republic of Moldova ‘there does not exist any antivirus against censorship and manipulation’ (Bogatu, 2004: 5).    

According to Freedom House, ‘a new type of media censorship has taken place in the former Soviet Union countries with the result of suppressing the independent media[8]. Nowadays, political power uses more ‘tools’ (suppression measures) to control the mass media than previously. Among them are: measures to assure the security of the regime, the implementation of legislative measures to regulate the activity of media and also the narrowing of the audience of foreign media.

However, the implementation of old tactics is becoming more difficult, especially because of the increased access citizens have to the Internet. That source of information could be limited if society considers discussion of the political sphere necessary, something authorities do not usually like.

 

The quality of Teleradio-Moldova Company

In comparison with modern developments taking place around the world, necessary changes in the activity of Moldovan TV media are delayed. In 2001, several TV channels already existed in the Republic of Moldova. One of them, Pro TV Chisinau, tried to introduce new kinds of programs to the public. In spite of that, the central TV station, the only one in the country with national coverage, lagged behind in regard to freedom of expression, the impartial reporting of events, the form and content of broadcasting, the enterprise, and its technical equipment (Cheianu, 2001: 12).

Changes in the field of audiovisual media have had a contradictory character. Liberation from the monopoly of state-party rule established by the totalitarian regime was replaced by the steady attempts of the political power, already elected in a democratic way, to regain the same control (Marin, 2000a: 12). The case of Teleradio-Moldova activity constitutes the most explicit example.

In accordance with the 1995 Law on audiovisual media, this institution was supposed to reorganize as public TV in order to gain independence for its creative activities and to reflect the interests of the different social strata, as well[9]. However, this institution has continued to be strongly faithful to the attribute ‘state’ from its previous label and to practise overt political partisanship. With exception of the period of 1992-6, the state company Teleradio-Moldova was continuously under the control of a party or a political alliance that had won election, while the national radio tried to follow the rules of the impartial journalism (Marin, 2000a:12).  

The relation of Teleradio-Moldova with political sphere proved to be a strong impediment for the reformation of this audiovisual company. For a long time it favoured the vision and the ideology of the parliamentary majority because of imperfect legislation.

Under the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, all three leaders of the TV Company were elected by Parliament and were subject to dismissal by Parliament, as well. Representatives of the opposition had no access to the state audiovisual media during the governing period of the Agrarian Democrat Party, in 1994-8. Later, when the Communist Party won a majority in the Parliament, representatives of all other parties were dismissed from the leadership of Teleradio-Moldova. In this way, the communists extended their monopoly over information (Cheianu, 2001: 13). The programming of the national TV is considered imperfect (Cheianu, 2001: 13) because it devotes too much time to programs that reflect the activity of state administration in: Ora Parlamentului (Parliament’s hour), Ora Preşedintelui (The President’s Hour), informational programs such as Mesager (The Messenger) and Telejurnal (TV journal), thematic programs such as Baştina (The Origin), Orologiu sentimental (The Sentimental Watch), Sαnαtatea (Health), Intersecţii TV (TV Intersections) and Ateneu (The public Building for Performances), and in its variety of entertainment programs, as well. Teleradio-Moldova does not provide the public with serious analytical programmes about politics in which experts or commentators are guests. Also, events are often presented in a partial way and from only one point of view.

In reference to content and issues, the central TV of the Republic of Moldova remains educational, simplified, raw, only for declarations – the same dogmatic tool it was created to be by soviet authorities (Cheianu, 2001: 13). Researchers note that most of the programmes are addressed to residents of provincial areas, where the largest percentage of the country’s population lives. Issues are presented simply, based on the concept that the public in the provinces do not have big expectations and cannot criticize too much. Apart from the simplified and raw manner in which the TV channel presents provincial life, issues are narrated in accordance with an ideal and sentimental conception. The issues are usually chosen by chance, as are their subjects, who are not selected for their exceptional experiences.

Journalists present their reports using lots of clichés, and wooden and misleading language, and they do not always have a good understanding of the problems they choose to describe and of which topics would reflect them better. This happens in part because the audiovisual narrations are presented with improper syntax, which often impedes understanding of the meaning.


 

Mass media activity in electoral campaigns

After the proclamation of independence, many media in the Republic of Moldova, having gained freedom from the totalitarian regime, saw their new role as reporting on developments in political life. Naturally, political issues become more prominent during electoral campaigns, when mass media get actively involved in politics, contributing to politicians’ promotion to power.

The written and audiovisual media expressed very clearly their preference to serve the political sphere or a certain segment of it to the detriment of citizens and society in general. The electoral propaganda, violence and intolerance of other opinions did not offer voters the necessary informational support for judgment and free choice’ (Marin, 2000b: 4).

The influence on media activity of political marketing, formed of all the actions targeted at projecting the political ‘product’, becomes more noticeable during electoral campaigns. It seems that the goal of political marketing is to obtain an agreement between the producers of the political images and their consumers, between the offer and the demand. The goal of the mass media is to influence citizens, not just to encourage them to honour one of their basic duties.

According to ΕΙΜ[10] estimates, during the parliamentary election campaign of 2001 in the Republic of Moldova, most of the media supported certain political parties. There was no independent press, and events were presented in a very partial way. (Hill, 2001: 130-9).

National researchers believe that, during that campaign, Moldovan media generally adopted two approaches: entirely positive or entirely negative (Vasilica, 2002: 7-10). That means that mass media, divided into different political factions, overlooked the truth, presenting their side as only positive and their opponents side as only negative. As a result, the campaign became very tense, and also dark because of the concealment of accurate information about the candidates. Such tactics, which are still used in the Republic of Moldova during different kinds of electoral campaigns, do not supply citizens with the information necessary but, on the contrary, obstruct them from understanding the truth and making informed choices.

Legislative regulations concerning the activity of media in electoral campaigns are believed to be another impediment to citizens’ access to sufficient information. ‘The imperfect legislation conducts to legal nihilism’ (Infotag, 2001: 27). Continuous changes in legislation encourage media discussions about: the allowable time for candidates in audiovisual debates or for their electoral advertising, certain definitions like ‘electoral story’, and the activity of various media, especially Teleradio-Moldova, that support power behind the scenes, or some media that agree to transmit certain political messages (Bunduchi, 2005: 3).

Examination of the activity of mass media during most pre-electoral and post-electoral periods carried out by different organizations[11] showed the ruling party was a favourite of mass media with national coverage. These examinations demonstrated that a portion of the press that had declared it would not indirectly help candidates spread their messages did so anyway. Another part of media was balanced between critical and supporting messages for the ruling party. Experts say that media that support the opposition usually present a greater variety of views and issues, although they remain basically very negative toward everything relating to the ruling party. On the other hand, the media that support the government stand in ‘the haven of positive information’ (Bogatu, 2006: 21). The whole picture is that most issues are political and relate to the activity of the local administration, the economy or the justice system.

In spite of the limiting and, more often, authoritarian tendencies of the Government, the Internet has become today a real source of impartial information for citizens. The Internet is developing quickly, partly in accordance with the recommendations of the European Union, but also due to the demand of a large number of emigrants, for whom it constitutes a very important way of communicating with relatives. In the Republic of Moldova, most Internet users enjoy free access to information. However, censorship and oversight does occur in the places where most of Moldovans have access to the Internet: in Internet cafes and at work. Moldovan intelligence agencies have developed the ability to monitor the Internet and, in reference to illegal activities that make use of the internet, national legislation is very tough[12].    

According to data from the National Agency for Regulation of Telecommunications and Informatics, recent developments in the Internet market in the Republic of Moldova have been very dramatic. For example, in 2007 demand for access to the high-speed Internet already exceeded availability. In 2005 about 7% of the population of the country was connected to the Internet, but by 2006 that figure had doubled.

 


Discussion

During the transition period from totalitarian to democratic government the Republic of Moldova passed through a series of unanticipated policies, social and economic developments that were especially noticeable in the mass media field.

At the beginning of the 1990s, shortly before and after the proclamation of independence, the country was dominated by a general euphoria, which encouraged the illusion that the change from authoritarian journalism to a free press would be accomplished quickly and with no turning back. 

After the collapse of the preceding regime, several beneficial changes did occur in the country. Political pluralism, in which many voices were heard, was established. Censorship was abolished. National legislation was amended to conform with international conventions on the defence of human rights and liberties. However, in reality most of the desired transformations remained little more than a beautiful dream. Unfortunately, ‘Mass media remained almost unchanged with the reference to their structure and activity. They achieved only multiple poles and as to the rest continued to rotate around the institutions in power or those wanting to attain power.’ (Marin, 2001: 2). 

The engagement of journalism with political power was especially noticeable during the course of the privatization of mass media and their attachment to the political parties on which, in most cases, they developed a hidden political dependence. As a result, media behaviour significantly influenced public opinion regarding the social role of democratic journalism.

At the beginning of the ’90s, 50% of the press and all audiovisual media were under state administration. The process of privatizing the mass media was encouraged by all succeeding governments of the Republic of Moldova, irrespective of their political preferences and actions, which demonstrated that they had very different understandings of this issue. At the same time that the Government was steadily handing over ownership of the media, state institutions were finding indirect ways to maintain their influence.

The strong propagandistic character of the press can be explained by the fact that 40% of all the newspapers that circulated in the country in 2006 were party newspapers. The number of political newspapers is diminishing; that seems logical because the number of political organizations is diminishing, as well. Also, the political power still exerts strong control over the audiovisual media, especially Teleradio-Moldova, the only TV station in the Republic of Moldova with national coverage.

It is possible to understand the degree to which Moldovan mass media are independent by rating them according to the level at which they agree to serve the political power in achieving its goals.

It would also be correct to estimate their level of independence today in relation to the intensity with which the existence of 27 political parties leads to excessive politicization of the information environment. Politicians misrepresent the truth with their publishing activities, which are persistent but irregular, and which only increase during electoral campaigns. Today, only a few Moldovan media have managed to distance themselves from political power. Among those who have are the newspapers-members of the API and also several private audiovisual media.

According to a 2007 assessment by Freedom House, for the first time in Moldova’s history as an independent state, the mass media were considered not free. In terms of press freedom, Moldova shared 144th place with Liberia[13]. Moldovan mass media returned to their previous status of partly free in 2008, as the borders of the EU got closer, Freedom House announced.

In spite of that, there are still many reasons to question why Moldovan media become so entangled with political power? It is clear, first of all, that there are economic reasons. Another reason Moldovan media still have a long road to travel toward freedom of expression and economic independence is the ‘modern model of censorship[14], which, according to Freedom House, takes place in the same way as in other former countries of the Soviet Union.

Certainly, political power is searching for new ways of influencing the media, especially as implementation of its old tactics becomes more difficult with the increasing access of the citizens to the Internet, already an important source of impartial information. It is possible that the engagement of journalism with political sphere could lead next to limits on Internet access or distortion of its informational space. Everything depends on the level at which the Moldovan society is ready to accept as necessary political discussion, even though it usually bothers authorities.


Notes

1 Association of Independent Press

[2] Petru Luchinchi was the Speaker of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova (1993-6) and the President of the Republic of Moldova (1996-01).

[3] International Journalism Centre

[4] See the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, article 34 (5).

[5] See ‘Limitari preventive, Cenzura’, Mass media si legislatia, Acces-Info, http://www.acces-info.org.md/index.php?cid=169&lid=193.

[6] Freedom of Expression and Access to Information Promotion Centre Access-Info,  http://www.acces-info.org.md.

[7] Showed an independent report conducted by the representatives of 13 civic organizations from the Republic of Moldova in March 2007.

[8] See http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/06/D87D2B4A-E901-43BB-9D05-88FF34AA2C65.html that refers to the report of Freedom House entitled ‘Muzzling The Media: The Return Of Censorship In The Commonwealth Of Independent States’.

[9] See the article 1 of the Law about Audiovisual Media adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova in 1995.

 [10] European institute for the Media

 [11] See researches conducted by: CIJ, CIVIS, API, IPP, IMAS Chisinau.

 [12] According to the results of the researches conducted during the collaborative partnership between four leading academic institutions: the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, Berkman Centre for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, the Advanced Network Research Group at the Cambridge Security Programme, University of Cambridge, and the      Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University. See      http://opennet.net/research/profiles/moldova.

 [14] as before

 

References

Bogatu, Petru(2004) ‘Un caine de paza’ in serviciul puterii’. Mass media in Moldova June: 5.

Bogatu, Petru (2006) ‘Mass media si puterea’. Mass media in Moldova December: 21.

Bunduchi, Ion (2005) ‘Teleradio-Moldova: serviciu public in serviciul cui?’. Mass media in Moldova June: 3.

Cantir, Sandu (1997) ‘Legea presei in Republica Moldova’ Mass media in Moldova July: 12-3.

Cheianu, Constantin (2001) ‘Amatorism, stagnare, obedienta fata de putere’ Mass media in Moldova June: 12-3.

Dabija, Nicolae (1994) Literatura si Arta May.

Hill, Ronald J. (2001) ‘Profile – Moldova Votes Backwards: The 2001 Parliamentary Election’ The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 17(4): 130-9.

Infotag (2001) ‘Alegerile si mijloacele de informare in masa’ Mass media in Moldova June: 27.

Lazur, Dimitrie (2006) ‘Privatizarea ziarelor guvernamentale: schimbari de forma, nu de continut’ Mass media in Moldova June: 22-3.

Macovei, Petru (2005) ‘Alegerile, ca un examen…’ Mass media in Moldova June: 5.

Marin, Constantin (1999) ‘Presa de partid si valoarea societatii civile’ Mass media in Moldova June: 22.

Marin, Constantin (2000a) ‘Audiovizualul: oportunitatea lobbysmului public’ Mass media in Moldova December: 12.

Marin, Constantin (2000b) ‘Mass media din Republica Moldova in an electoral’ Mass media in Moldova June: 4.

Marin, Constantin (2001) ‘Mass media din Moldova: implicaţii politice», Mass media in Moldova December: 2-3.

Moraru, Victor (2001) Mass Media VS politica, Chisinau, USM.

Skvirenko, Grigorie (1990) ‘Pentru un ziar al capitalei’ Chisinau, Gazeta de Seara October: 3.

Smid, Milan (1996) ‘Media policy – does it exist in Central East Europe?’ in Media 95, Karolinum, Prague, 1996, p. 121-5.

Spinei, Vasile (2001) Interview, Rodica Socolov.

Topa, Tudor (1994) ‘Ziar national independent’ Moldova Suverana January 22: 1.

Vasilica, Vasile (2002) ‘Comportamentul presei scrise in campanii electorale’ Mass media in Moldova December: 7-10.

Zamura, Elena (2001) ‘КаквозниклаНезависимаяNezavisimaya Moldova October: 7.

By Rodica Socolov

 

The recent spasm of post-election violence in Moldova holds both peril and promise.

 

The beating and disappearance of people for their political views mean the European Union risks finding another Belarus-style dictatorship on its borders. But the country’s promise lies in its youth, who have shown themselves to be less afraid and more willing to speak the truth than their elders, who grew up under the Soviet system.

 

After several days of surfing the Internet for information about the horrible events in Chisinau, in which violent protests followed the alleged re-election of the communists, it is still hard to believe they happened in my home country.

 

Moldovans usually are too cautious when decisive action is needed. This is a tolerant nation. Many times when the truth should be spoken, instead there is silence.

 

People got used to hiding their thoughts during the Soviet era, when a single word at the wrong time could bring isolation or punishment. “Don’t bother me and I won’t bother you,” Moldovans often say.

 

But the protests of April 7, with their emphatic rejection of that philosophy, were an exception in the history of Moldova. Years from now, people will still be trying to understand what led to such anger. But, as things now stand, there is little hope the situation will be investigated properly.

 

These events prove, first of all, that the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova cannot deal with situations like this. Its methods are old and filthy, violent and offensive. It seems we are not far from the establishment of a police state.

 

After the protests turned violent, President Vladimir Voronin immediately accused almost everyone – opposition parties, teachers, journalists, businessmen and members of human rights organisations – of trying to stage a political coup.

 

While everyone wonders how the country’s two main administrative buildings, the Parliament and the Presidential Palace, could be vandalised so easily, the ruling party has occupied itself by bullying, arresting and intimidating anyone who might express an opinion.

 

Both magnificent buildings were built during the Soviet era for the comfort of the communist administration. Since the country became independent, they have become symbols of the Moldovan state, whichever party was in power.

 

Many Moldovans are terrified by the cost of the repairs, which will be a huge burden for them. The country is $4 billion in debt. Where will another $27 million, according to the ruling party’s estimate, be found to cover the cost?

 

In addition, valuable state documents, and private data, as well, were trampled or burned. This was a barbarian act not only against buildings and politicians, but also against many Moldovan citizens.

 

Had such an incident occurred in a different country, people would question the governing party’s ability to ensure security. But in Moldova, it is the people who are questioned.

 

It is hard to imagine, but in the parliamentary elections of 5 April the communists were reported to have won the majority of votes. It is true that the majority of the population got used to the communists and no longer considered them as bad as the communists of the 1990s, against whom they rebelled. But nobody would have expected such an easy victory.

 

The communists came to power in 2001, as people voted for change. During the last eight years they have proved more liberal then their predecessors, but even so, they never risked giving up their lucky communist niche. If they changed, they risked becoming just another party, indistinguishable from many others.

 

Still, they did gain some trust by promising to bring the country into the European family and ensure people’s fundamental rights.

 

But was this really enough to win the majority of seats in the Parliament? People’s lives have not improved so much since 2001.

 

A couple of years ago, the U.S. based organization Freedom House declared the press in Moldova “not free.” Its status was upgraded to “partially free” at the end of 2008, just before the election year.

 

In spite of restrictions on the press, access to the Internet started to change people’s lives. Mobile and online communication made a huge difference for many, especially those who, after many years, re-established communication with family members working abroad.

 

Attempts to limit Internet access began when the first signs emerged of possible fraud in elections, and the news spread more quickly than ever before because of new ways of communication.

 

The reaction of Moldovan society to recent events has been massive disappointment. Police officers are resigning. Journalists are seeking asylum in other countries. Parents are searching desperately for their children. The terror continues.

 

Now, the Constitutional Court has ordered a recount. But the court is in the hands of the communists. At this critical stage in the country’s history, when both peril and promise have never been greater, a recount is not enough.

 

The party must be punished for its actions. The people do not deserve a party that has neglected them, tortured them and trampled their rights.

 

It has become obvious that Moldova needs a new election. Only in that way, can the true will of the people be determined. And even that, by itself, will not be sufficient. Moldova won’t be able to solve the crisis without the support of a large number of political actors, civil society and international organizations.

 

Isn’t it enough for your people, Mr President?

 

 

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